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Abstract
Household debt in many advanced economies has increased signifi cantly since the 1980s 
and accelerated in the years prior to the Great Recession, resulting in an aggregate 
reduction of saving rates in the developed economies. Some of those economies are now 
deleveraging, which may be affecting their recovery. We try to disentangle how these fi nancial 
developments infl uence private consumption in a panel of OECD countries, after controlling 
for the traditional determinants (income, net fi nancial and non-fi nancial wealth, and interest 
rates). Consistent with the changes in the distribution of fi nancial constraints, we fi nd that 
aggregate consumption is also driven by the dynamics of housing debt accumulation and 
deleveraging. Precautionary savings, due to labour income uncertainty, have also infl uenced 
household decisions especially, during the 2007-2009 period.
Keywords: private consumption, fi nancial developments, precautionary savings, debt.
JEL classifi cation: E21, E44, F01.
Resumen
Las familias de buena parte de los países desarrollados venían aumentando su endeudamiento 
desde los años ochenta, y este proceso se aceleró signifi cativamente en los años previos a la 
Gran Recesión. Al mismo tiempo, durante ese periodo se produjo una disminución de su tasa 
de ahorro. Tras la crisis, el desapalancamiento que las familias están llevando a cabo puede 
estar afectando a su consumo y, por tanto, al ritmo de recuperación de las economías. En 
este trabajo se analiza cómo afectan estas decisiones fi nancieras de los hogares al consumo 
agregado de los países de la OCDE en el período 1980-2013, una vez se han tenido en 
cuenta los determinantes tradicionales (renta, riqueza fi nanciera y no fi nanciera y tipos de 
interés). Se muestra que, de forma consistente con cambios en las restricciones fi nancieras, 
el consumo se ha visto afectado por la acumulación de deuda y su posterior reducción. 
Asimismo, y de forma coherente con la existencia de un ahorro por motivo precaución, el 
aumento de la incertidumbre sobre las rentas laborales ha infl uido en las decisiones de las 
familias, en particular durante el período 2007-2009.
Palabras clave: consumo privado, desarrollo fi nanciero, ahorro por motivo precaución, 
deuda.
Códigos JEL: E21, E44, F01.
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1. Introduction  
Household debt in most advanced economies has increased significantly since 
the 1980s and accelerated in the years previous to the Great Recession that 
started in 2007-2008 (see left-hand panel of Figure 1). In fact, since 2000 the 
rapid debt growth has allowed consumption to grow faster than income, 
entailing a reduction in the saving rates of the majority of developed countries 
during the expansionary phase of the business cycle (see right-hand panel of 
Figure 1). Although this process has been heterogeneous across countries 
(Denmark and United Kingdom reduced their household saving rate by 6 pp, 
while it increased by 4 pp in New Zealand and Austria), the overall saving rate 
of the OECD countries declined by almost 1 pp between 2001 and 2007 (and the 
lending capacity by more than 2pp). 
  
Figure 1. Household Debt and Saving Rate in the OECD Countries: 2000-2013 
Some of those economies are currently deleveraging to achieve a sustainable 
level of debt relative to income and this balance-sheet restructuring may be 
affecting their recovery. In the initial phase after the financial shock, the 
aggregate OECD household saving rate increased by more than 2 pp since 2007 
(and the lending capacity by almost 5 pp), involving an adjustment in private 
consumption. Afterwards, there has been a downward correction, although 
they are still above those observed in the Great Moderation period.  
Many analysts have said that household “debt overhang” and the increase in 
house prices observed in many countries before 2007 could play an important 
role in explaining the consequences of the current financial crisis over the 
business cycle. In fact, we know that historically housing busts and credit 
crunches are associated with deeper and longer-lasting recessions in advanced 
economies (Claessens et al. 2009). Moreover, this time the recovery process is 
taking place in a very uncertain environment with persistently high 
unemployment rates. This paper studies the empirical influence on 
consumption of these factors. 
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In fact, there is considerable heterogeneity across countries regarding changes 
in and the composition of assets and debt. In some of these countries, debt 
levels rose until 2007 in parallel with the increase in household wealth. In fact, 
the rise in gross household debt and the subsequent correction has been 
associated with the developments in the housing market and, specifically, with 
the boom-bust of housing prices. That is the case for countries like the US, the 
UK, Ireland or Spain where house prices have been declining more (e.g., 
Garrote et al. 2013). Whereas in Italy or Korea, the increase in household debt 
has been associated with consumer loans, which have very different 
characteristics to mortgages. And, at the other extreme, households in Germany 
and Japan have reduced their debt level since the 2000s. Figure 2 compares the 
notable differences since the 2000s between developments in debt, wealth, 
income and consumption in the US and Germany.  
  
  
Figure 2. Household Consumption, Income and Balance Sheets in the US and 
Germany: 2000-2013 
Private consumption has increased more than disposable income in the US 
since 2001, involving a decline in the saving rate in the years previous to the 
recession (upper left-hand panel). Subsequently, an adjustment in consumption 
was recorded jointly with a significant increase in the saving rate. By contrast, 
German households have expanded their saving rate over the whole period 
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(upper right-hand panel), and did not reduce consumption during the 
recession.  
The lower panel of Figure 2 shows the enormous differences between the 
behaviour of household balance sheets in these two economies. Household debt 
increased in the US until 2007 and declined during the recession. These 
developments were anticipated by housing wealth, although the adjustment 
during the recession has been stronger on the assets than on the liabilities side. 
Since 2012, both net financial assets and housing wealth have recovered, while 
debt has continued to decline, closing the gap among them to the relative levels 
of 2000. By contrast, housing wealth in Germany declined during the 
expansionary period, stabilised afterwards and begun to increase by 2011, while 
debt has continued to diminish. A similar analysis could be made looking at 
residential investment instead of consumption given the strong correlation 
between household debt, residential investment and housing prices. 
These changes in savings and balance-sheet composition have been influenced 
by technical and institutional changes in the financial sector during the last 
thirty years. Financial liberalisation made it easier the availability of credit, 
especially in presence of borrowing constraints. For example, depending of the 
countries, households could borrow more easily against their wealth (mainly 
housing) significantly reducing their saving rate (Muellbauer, 2007). And the 
pro-cyclicality of the financial system for real decisions is already well 
documented in the literature (for example, in the financial accelerator model of 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). 
Moreover, the sudden reversal of the credit-loosening conditions after 2007 may 
have also exacerbated the consequences of the crisis. High leverage households 
may want to downsize their mortgage or default. Others may want to reduce 
their obligations paying down their current debts and reducing new borrowing. 
For example, Mian and Sufi (2010) have documented that the regions of the U.S. 
that have experienced the largest swings in household borrowing have also 
experienced the largest declines in employment and output. And at the 
theoretical level Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) have shown that in the 
presence of a deleverage shock, the level of debt matters. Highly indebted 
households face different constraints to low indebted households and they 
emphasise that the distribution of debt has real effects especially in the presence 
of a zero bound interest rate constraint. 
This paper tries to disentangle how these financial developments have 
influenced aggregated household consumption in the advanced economies 
considering the most recent period of house price boom-bust. In particular, we 
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analyze empirically if there is a role for a credit channel that could make the 
debt ratio to have a relevant role explaining consumption dynamics. For that 
purpose we use a panel of OECD countries in the 1980-2013 period, controlling 
for the traditional determinants of private consumption: income, net wealth and 
interest rates.  
A second factor closely related to the financial sector is the existence of 
households' uncertainty about their future expected income. Precautionary 
savings models show that the saving rate climbs (consumption falls) in 
response to an increase in uncertainty (see Carroll et al., 2012). It is clear that 
many advanced economies are experiencing sudden rises in the unemployment 
rate after the financial crisis in 2007 that may be considered by households as a 
permanent and unexpected shift in their labour income. Thus, we investigate 
the relevance of this precautionary effect on consumption once we have 
considered the wealth and debt effects to account for possible income and 
financial shocks. 
Thus, the second section of the paper presents the empirical tests for these two 
additional financial factors in a (solved out) specification of private 
consumption. It also introduces the construction of the database and the 
empirical counterparts of the theoretical determinants of household decisions. 
The third section presents the econometric results where a dynamic 
consumption equation includes as additional factors the credit-channel and 
labour uncertainty. As robustness exercise we will investigate in section fourth 
whether these results may depend on the existence of non-Ricardian effects on 
private consumption given the recent rise in the public deficits and debt of 
many advanced economies. Fifth section analyses the period after the financial 
crisis, 2008-2013, and whether these additional financial factors are having a 
differentiated effect on consumption across countries. Finally, section six 
summarises the main conclusions and possible future research. 
2. Empirical considerations  
Taking into account the policy analysis objectives of the paper, we follow 
Muellbauer (2007) and adopt the solved out consumption function approach, 
which integrates the intertemporal Euler condition and the budget constraint in 
just one equation. Besides, this will allow us to incorporate long-run 
information on household decisions, which could be important currently, when 
departures from steady state may be very large in some countries. The most 
simple solved out consumption equation can be specified as follows:  
?????? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ???? ? ????    [1] 
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CN being the non-durable consumption of households, Y their labour income, W 
their net wealth (including both financial and real assets) and r the real interest 
rate. This specification implies that in the long run, permanent income is 
captured through a weighted average of current income and non-human 
wealth. Note that the elasticity of consumption out of income and out of wealth 
is constrained to add up to one. Thus, this could be interpreted as households 
trying to balance two ratios at the same time: consumption over income (the 
saving rate) and wealth over income. The additional explanatory variable, the 
interest rate, will attain a negative effect (?<0) on current consumption due to 
intertemporal substitution effects. 
The empirical counterparts for the variables in this model are difficult to obtain 
for a broad sample of advanced economies since the 1980s, even though the 
frequency of information is annual. In particular, labour income is proxied with 
disposable income, which is a more homogeneous measure of income, as it is 
directly obtained from National Accounts.2 This implies that we are including 
part of the revenue generated by wealth, biasing upwards the parameter ?. 
Financial assets and liabilities are taken from the financial accounts of the 
different countries and non-financial assets are proxied with the housing stock 
at market prices. The real interest rate corresponds to the 10-year yields of 
government debt minus annual consumption inflation; therefore, it does not 
include the possible spread applied by financial institutions to consumers’ 
loans. 
With respect to consumption, it is also difficult to obtain a homogeneous 
measure of non-durable consumption for the whole sample. Furthermore, the 
classification of durable goods can change depending on the frequency of the 
data considered. This compels us to use total private consumption (C) obtained 
from the National Accounts as the dependent variable in [1]. Recent empirical 
evidence shows this does not need to be a limitation at all. On the contrary, 
durable consumption reacts much more than non-durable consumption both to 
expected and unexpected shocks to households’ resources (Coulibaly and Li, 
2006, Aaronson et al. 2012, Browning and Crossley, 2009). Durable goods act as 
insurance against unexpected shocks, and it is important to take them into 
account when we want to analyse the role of uncertainty. Moreover, this 
approach also controls for possible non-separabilities between both types of 
consumption.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2 The list of countries as well as the sources of variables used in the empirical analysis is 
detailed in Appendix 1. 
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However, the inclusion of durability has implications for the solved out 
consumption function and for the random walk result of Hall (Mankiw, 1982). 
In particular, assuming that the services of the durable goods enter into the 
utility function, and that these services are proportional to the stock of durables, 
it can be shown that not only are current shocks relevant to taking decisions 
today, but so are past shocks. That would suggest the inclusion of lagged 
consumption in the empirical specification. An “observable equivalent” 
conclusion would be reached if we were to consider instead the existence of 
habits in non-durable consumption. 
One of the most popular tests on consumption theory was that of excess 
sensitiveness; whereby several researchers found that changes in current 
income had informational content to forecast the growth rate of consumption. 
One explanation for this result was the existence of financially constrained 
consumers, which cannot be debtors, so they do not consume according to their 
permanent income but according to their current income. Therefore, for these 
type of households, consumption will be linked to current income (i.e.,  ?????? ?
??????? ? ???? ). 
Denoting by ? the percentage of total consumption of constrained agents (this 
parameter may change over time) and assuming that the income of constrained 
and unconstrained households move in parallel, it is possible aggregate both 
formulations to obtain the consumption function for both types of households 
(Muellbauer and Lattimore, 1995). The expression, taking into account durable 
consumption, would be: 
?????? ? ??? ? ????????? ? ?? ?????? ? ?????????? ? ????????? ? ????? ?
???? ? ?????????? ? ???????? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ??????? ? ?? ? ???   [2] 
This expression resembles the traditional error correction model for private 
consumption. It establishes that private consumption growth will depend on 
the increase in their basic determinants (including some inertia) and the 
progressive correction from long-term desired consumption. Both country and 
time effects are included in the specification. 
Focusing on the short-term determinants of private consumption growth, there 
are three additional regressors considered by the literature that we will control 
for in the baseline specification. First, it is convenient to introduce a variable 
which captures household income growth expectations (Yexp) to complement 
current income and wealth.3 Both expected income growth and current income 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
3?This variable is taken from data of an OECD survey on households’ economic sentiment (see 
Appendix 1). 
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growth could be jointly determined with consumption; therefore, they will be 
instrumented with lags of the other variables in our preferred specification. 
Second, we consider the possible impact on aggregate consumption of income 
distribution, by including the Gini index (G). That takes into account that 
different subgroups of population present a different propensity to consume 
out of income and wealth; we expect it to be negatively signed. And third, it has 
been argued that the elasticity out of net wealth should be different depending 
on the liquidity of the assets included in the portfolio. But besides the liquidity 
differences, the work among others of Aron et al. (2011) recognises also the 
importance of credit conditions in the mortgage boom preceding the financial 
crisis and the subsequent significant drop. In order to control for those effects 
and because of the varying impact of institutional changes on the financial 
sector, the empirical analysis will distinguish between net financial assets (NFA) 
and housing wealth (HW). We would have liked to separate also shares and 
pension funds from the other financial assets, but sample limitations meant that 
this was not feasible. 
Substantial empirical research with micro data during the last two decades has 
shown that different types of households respond differently to given changes 
in economic environment. Moreover, the crisis has shown that the 
responsiveness of different groups to shocks has changed. And in the presence 
of a debt shock, highly indebted households respond differently than low 
indebted ones (see Eggerston and Krugman, 2012). In order to incorporate some 
of these composition effects in our aggregate analysis, we include the debt 
dynamics in our specification. Thus, our first testable hypothesis is that, once 
we have considered the traditional determinants, debt accumulation (D) first 
and deleveraging latter reflects changes in the credit conditions affecting 
households’ decisions. It would indicate that both credit availability and the 
“excessive” household debt affects consumption once we have considered the 
net wealth effect. If that is the case, adding current debt accumulation in the 
baseline model should favour consumption (?? ? ???whereas past household 
debt accumulation should be negatively related to consumption (?? ? ??.  
?????? ?
??? ? ????????? ? ???????? ? ???????????? ? ????? ? ???????????? ?
??????????? ? ????? ???? ?????? ? ???????? ? ???????????? ? ?????????? ?
???????? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ?????????? ? ????      [3] 
Obviously, contemporaneous changes in households’ debt, our proxy for credit 
conditions, is an endogenous variable in this context, as long as it capture both 
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demand side (jointly determined with consumption) and supply side 
developments in the credit market. Therefore, in order to check if credit 
constrains perform a role it is necessary to instrument this variable. We chose 
two instruments. The first one is a predetermined demographic variable, the 
dependency ratio (percentage of population over 65), as long as data of 
households finances shows that at this age households start the process of 
wealth reduction, in line with life-cycle hypothesis. Second, we make use of the 
financial reform index constructed by Abiad et al. (2008), after being enlarged to 
take into account recent developments in the financial sector, in order to isolate 
the changes in the regulatory environment which can be crucial in determining 
the credit supply conditions of every economy.  
Besides the credit conditions, the existence of a risk perception about the 
household future expected income also affects their real decisions. In models of 
precautionary savings, households accumulate a larger stock of wealth to offset 
the increase in unemployment risk. And after a negative shock, consumption 
can overshoot the required downward adjustment (see Carol, 2012) 
Therefore, in expression [3] we will also test if a measure of unemployment risk 
is quantitatively a relevant factor explaining the recent drop in consumption 
relative to income across advanced economies (?? ? ??. We proxy this effect 
using the standard deviation of the changes in the unemployment rate (U) in 5-
year windows (std(?U)). By using the first differences we get rid-off of the 
structural component of the unemployment rate.  
As can be seen in Figure 3, this indicator of households’ uncertainty shows a 
very high synchronisation with more sophisticated measures of policy 
uncertainty such as those developed by Baker et al. (2013). In fact, for the 
countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK and US) and the period 
(1997-2013 for the European countries, 1990-2013 for Canada and 1985-2013 for 
US) where this economic policy uncertainty index is available, both indicators 
are positively correlated and the explanatory power is high. By country, the 
worst result is obtained in Germany, where the correlation is 0.26, compared to 
0.85 in the case of the UK. Clearly, the variability of the changes in 
unemployment rate is determined by other factors in addition to changes in 
monetary, fiscal or regulatory policies, which are the variables considered by 
this economic policy uncertainty index. 
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Figure 3. Economic policy uncertainty index and standard deviation of the 
first differences of the unemployment rate 
3. Consumption and financial conditions  
Before testing the hypothesis about the influence of financial conditions, Table 1 
presents the estimation results for the baseline consumption equation. As 
shown in the previous section, one of the main advantages of the solved out 
consumption function is that it incorporates long-run information on household 
decisions. In fact, once the possibility has been considered that credit 
constrained households exist, the solved out consumption function can be 
understood as an error correction mechanism. From a statistical point of view, 
this is a very convenient representation, as private consumption and most of its 
determinants are non-stationary variables. Therefore, if they cointegrate, the 
deviations from that long-run relationship should provide valuable information 
for projecting the growth rate of consumption.          
Thus, the estimation approach for the panel follows the traditional two-step 
procedure applied to single equation cointegrating relationships. It involves 
assuming, once we have included fixed effects to control for non-observable 
characteristics and time effect to capture, for example, common aggregate 
shocks to all the countries, an identical form of long-run consumption function 
for all countries and also a common function that measures the deviations from 
such a relationship. 
Table 1a presents the panel estimation of the long-run relationship. The 
variables in the regressions appear in levels and, apart from the real interest 
rate, in logs and per capita. Therefore, the coefficients should be interpreted as 
elasticities. Reverse causality and endogeneity of regressors could be a relevant 
issue. However, as in most of the specifications the variables are integrated, the 
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superconvergence of the OLS guarantees the consistency of the parameters, 
even though their distribution is not a standard one. 
The first column considers current disposable income as the only determinant 
of consumption. The coefficient is statistically significant, positive and slightly 
higher than 1, reflecting a long-run downward trend in the saving rate, 
probably associated to the development of the financial sector and social safety 
nets in most of these countries. In fact, the Fisher type test checking for the 
stationarity of the residuals (see, for example, Baltagi [2008]) accepts the null 
hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots, implying disposable income is not 
enough to explain the evolution of private consumption in the long run. 
Therefore, we add another variable to the regression: household net wealth 
(column 2). At this stage, net wealth is not disaggregated into its financial and 
real counterparts, as long as the liquidity considerations that could justify 
different elasticities for these two components should not apply for a long 
enough time span. This variable is significant and the parameter is positive, 
showing gains in the fit of the model. As expected, the corresponding 
coefficient of current income diminishes but still the stationarity tests show that 
the residuals of, at least, some panels contain unit roots. 
TABLE 1A. LONG-RUN ESTIMATES OF SOLVED OUT CONSUMPTION FUNCTIONS. 
Dependent variable: per capita consumption. Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Constant -0.404 (0.034) 
-0.399 
(0.035) 
-0.304 
(0.045) 
-0.137 
(0.012)  
Current income 1.078 (0.009) 
1.033 
(0.014) 
1.020 
(0.014) 
0.972 
(0.007)  
Net wealth (-1) - 0.032 (0.007) 
0.025 
(0.007) 
0.028a 
(-)  
Real interest rate - - -0.328 (0.101) 
-0.529 
(0.086)  
Standard deviation×100 4.709 4.525 4.489 4.539  
Residual stationary tests     
     Fisher type (Inv. ???  46.618 
[0.288] 
51.926 
[0.140] 
52.540 
[0.128] 
57.527 
[0.056]  
      Imm-Pesaran-Shin -2.867 
[0.002] 
-2.307 
[0.011] 
-2.354 
[0.009] 
-2.279 
[0.011]  
N. observations 714 693 693 693  
Standard deviations in round brackets; P-values in square brackets; a, restricted coefficient.  
If we add the real interest rate, the results continue to improve (column 3). It is 
signed negative (i.e., an intertemporal substitution effect), and it is statistically 
significant, without changing the relevance of the other variables much. This 
interest rate is that of public debt, so it does not include the household risk 
premia but in the long run that premia should be stationary. In column 4 we 
check whether the parameters of current income and wealth add up to one, as 
implied by the theory. This constraint slightly worsens the fit of the model, but 
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the real interest rate coefficient becomes more robust and the stationarity tests 
of the residuals show no unit roots at the 94% of probability. Thus, that is the 
specification whose residuals will be included in the estimation of the solved 
out consumption functions, to capture the error correction term. 
The previous specification imply an estimated long-run marginal propensity to 
consume of 0.4-1.1 cents out of one unit of wealth.4 Although that value is 
below the estimates in the literature, some authors have argued that the “pure 
wealth effects” have been overestimated precisely so as not to consider 
precautionary or credit availability effects that are correlated with wealth (e.g., 
Carroll et. al 2012). We will analyse these effects in the short-run specification. 
Furthermore, it should be taken into account that our proxy for human wealth 
is disposable income, which includes part of the revenues of wealth.   
Table 1b presents the estimation results for the basic specification of the per 
capita consumption growth (equation [2]). Besides the income expectations and 
the Gini index terms, we incorporate separated wealth effects for financial 
assets and housing stocks. 
The first column presents the OLS estimates including as an additional 
regressor the deviation of the long-run relationship (the error correction term). 
This parameter is negatively signed and is very significant, confirming the 
cointegration of the long-run specification.  
The results reveal the relevance of the net financial assets and the difficulty of 
finding a significant relationship between housing wealth and consumption 
when pooling all the countries and time periods. In fact, the lagged housing 
wealth was significant and negatively signed, implying that only progressive 
increases or decreases of housing wealth have effects on the consumption path. 
All the other coefficients, except the changes in the real interest rate and the 
Gini index, are statistically significant and have the signs predicted by the 
theoretical considerations. 
When country dummies are included (column 2) or country and time dummies 
(column 3) we see a better fit and small changes in terms of the coefficients’ 
significance. Finally, column 4 also tries to control for the endogeneity of 
income (current and expected) with lags of all the right-hand side variables as 
instruments. These instruments seem to be orthogonal with the residuals (see 
the Sargan test). 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
4?This equation is specified in logs, so the estimated parameters represent elasticities. Therefore, 
the propensity to consume out of wealth would be equal to the elasticity multiplied by the ratio 
of consumption over net wealth, which, in our sample, shows a median of 0.20, the 10th 
percentile is 0.14 and the 90th percentile is 0.39.  
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TABLE 1B. ESTIMATION OF BASIC CONSUMPTION FUNCTION:  
Dependent variable: per capita consumption growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS IV 
Constant 0.007*** (0.001) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Consumption growth (-1) 0.194*** (0.034) 
0.154*** 
(0.035) 
0.137*** 
(0.036) 
0.191*** 
(0.045) 
Income growth 0.448*** (0.031) 
0.373*** 
(0.031) 
0.326*** 
(0.032) 
0.214 
(0.150) 
Income growth expectations 0.019*** (0.004) 
0.051*** 
(0.006) 
0.046*** 
(0.006) 
0.028 
(0.023) 
Gini index change (-1) -0.102 (0.078) 
-0.134* 
(0.075) 
-0.139* 
(0.073) 
-0.148** 
(0.076) 
Net financial assets growth (-1) 0.035*** (0.005) 
0.034*** 
(0.005) 
0.022*** 
(0.006) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
Housing wealth growth (-1) 0.026** (0.013) 
0.029** 
(0.013) 
0.033** 
(0.013) 
0.048*** 
(0.015) 
Housing wealth growth (-2) -0.020* (0.012) 
-0.023** 
(0.012) 
-0.029** 
(0.012) 
-0.023* 
(0.013) 
Real interest rate change (-1) -0.005 (0.038) 
-0.014 
(0.036) 
-0.061 
(0.040) 
-0.091** 
(0.046) 
Error correction mechanism -0.085*** (0.014) 
-0.073*** 
(0.014) 
-0.063*** 
(0.014) 
-0.070*** 
(0.024) 
Country dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies No No Yes Yes 
R2 0.563 0.612 0.678 0.667 
Standard deviation×100 1.514 1.427 1.299 1.364 
Durbin Watson 1.838 1.830 2.079 1.899 
Sargan test - - - 16.342 [0.231] 
N. observations 642 642 642 601 
Standard deviations in round brackets; P-values in square brackets; *, **, ***, significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively; Instruments: Variables lagged two to three periods. 
Analysing the IV estimates, the current income and the income expectations 
coefficients become not significant. However, countries with an increase in 
income inequality (higher Gini index) have lower consumption growth. This 
indicates that societies where the share of income in the top deciles is high have 
a higher saving rate. Moreover, under this estimated model both financial assets 
and housing stocks are significant for consumption, but in the latter case is the 
acceleration effect that is relevant as opposed to the growth effect in the former 
case. The former coefficient implies that in the short run marginal propensity to 
consume of 0.5-1.8 cents out of one unit of net financial wealth These results are 
difficult to compare with the work of Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005, 2013), 
that finds a higher MPC out of housing wealth than out of financial wealth with 
the data of 14 countries in the period previous to the last housing boom (1975-
1999). The main reason is that, unlike our work, they consider a financial wealth 
variable that excludes the least volatile components of financial wealth such as 
deposits, securities or insurance reserves. Nor can these results be compared to 
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Ludwig and Sløk's study (2004), which finds that the estimates of the two 
wealth effects are higher in the most recent period (1985-2000), but cannot 
conclude that the elasticity of housing is different to that of financial assets. In 
this case, the study only considers the behaviour of stock and housing prices 
(and not the quantities) in the determination of the effect of both wealth 
components on consumption. Also the real interest rate change becomes now 
relevant for consumption. The speed of adjustment of this cross-country 
equation (0.07) seems low compared with time series studies (Aron et al., 2012), 
even taking into account the relevance of the lagged consumption growth in 
our estimates. 
We are trying to determine whether the leverage process first and deleveraging 
latter on is a specific determinant of consumption growth, in addition to the 
traditional passive role the debt ratio plays through the wealth effect (Dynan, 
2012). This active role could be the result of households targeting a particular 
leverage level, or financial institutions using leverage as an indicator of 
households’ soundness. Thus, besides the consideration of net wealth, debt 
accumulation may reflect improving credit conditions. And similarly, 
households may want to reduce their leverage when house prices fall, 
especially when they see a high probability of job loss.   
  
Figure 4. Consumption residuals (2008-2013) and household debt   
As initial evidence of the existence of such an effect in the most recent period   
we present a scatter plot with the average cross-country residuals of the 
consumption equation (Table 1b, column 4) between 2008 and 2013 and the 
change in (the log of) the ratio of household debt to income in the same period 
and in a previous expansionary period (2001-2007). In Figure 4 we see, first, that  
countries with higher negative (positive) residuals after the Great Recession 
have been also characterized by a reduction (increase) in the debt to income 
ratio during the same period. At the same time, these where the countries 
where the debt to income ratio increased the most (least) in the Great 
Moderation period. This suggests that countries with higher (and negative) 
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consumption residuals are the ones with a higher debt ratio in the period 
previous to the commencement of deleveraging. 
However, these are a simple correlations calculated for a very specific sample 
period. It is necessary to check how debt works in a fully specified consumption 
equation over a longer horizon, to analyse any possible additional effect. 
Therefore, in Table 2 we re-estimate the last specification in Table 1B adding the 
contemporaneous and lagged growth of the household’s debt.5 
TABLE 2. ESTIMATION OF THE BASIC CONSUMPTION FUNCTION:  
Households debt & uncertainty.  
Dependent variable: consumption growth per capita. Country and time fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Constant 0.009** (0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Consumption growth (-1) 0.047 (0.035) 
0.151*** 
(0.046) 
0.061* 
(0.034) 
0.129*** 
(0.046) 
0.061* 
(0.034) 
0.124*** 
(0.044) 
Income growth 0.263*** (0.030) 
0.229* 
(0.134) 
0.271*** 
(0.030) 
0.315** 
(0.135) 
0.263*** 
(0.029) 
0.298** 
(0.131) 
Income growth expectations 0.035*** (0.005) 
0.016 
(0.021) 
0.034*** 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.021) 
0.034*** 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.020) 
Change in the Gini index (-1) -0.111 (0.068) 
-0.127* 
(0.073) 
-0.113* 
(0.067) 
-0.118* 
(0.071) 
-0.115* 
(0.065) 
-0.119* 
(0.069) 
Net financial assets growth (-1) 0.021*** (0.006) 
0.025*** 
(0.007) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.023*** 
(0.007) 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
0.018*** 
(0.007) 
Housing wealth growth (-1) 0.025* (0.013) 
0.041*** 
(0.014) 
0.025** 
(0.012) 
0.035** 
(0.015) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
0.027* 
(0.014) 
Housing wealth growth (-2) -0.030*** (0.011) 
-0.024* 
(0.013) 
-0.018 
(0.011) 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.014 
(0.011) 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
Real interest rate change (-1) -0.040 (0.037) 
-0.078* 
(0.044) 
-0.051 
(0.037) 
-0.077* 
(0.043) 
-0.056 
(0.036) 
-0.075* 
(0.042) 
Households debt growth 0.133*** (0.014) 
0.060** 
(0.030) 
0.144*** 
(0.014) 
0.093*** 
(0.032) 
0.141*** 
(0.013) 
0.092*** 
(0.031) 
Households debt growth (-2) - - -0.049*** (0.012) 
-0.038** 
(0.016) 
-0.045*** 
(0.012) 
-0.036** 
(0.015) 
Changes in uncertainty - - - - -0.011*** (0.002) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
Error correction mechanism -0.058*** (0.013) 
-0.073*** 
(0.022) 
-0.057*** 
(0.013) 
-0.081*** 
(0.022) 
-0.057*** 
(0.013) 
-0.083*** 
(0.021) 
R2 0.724 0.694 0.731 0.706 0.745 0.724 
Standard deviation×100 1.204 1.291 1.188 1.255 1.156 1.221 
Durbin Watson 1.808 1.937 1.886 1.981 1.862 1.919 
Sargan test - 21.449 [0.207] - 
17.251 
[0.438] - 
20.751 
[0.238] 
N. observations 642 601 642 601 642 601 
Standard deviations in round brackets; P-values in square brackets; *, **, ***, significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively; Instruments: Variables lagged two to three periods plus dependency ratio contemporaneous 
and lagged one period and financial liberalization index lagged one and two periods. 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
5?In fact, we have chosen the lag of debt growth providing the lowest Sargan test among the first 
four lags, which were statistically significant on individual basis. When household debt to 
income growth was considered instead of household debt growth the estimation results did not 
change except for the coefficient of the scale variable (current disposable income). 
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The debt growth coefficient is positive and significant when enters 
contemporaneously (columns 1 and 2) and negative and significant with a time 
lag of two years (columns 3 and 4). Thus, after controlling for net wealth and 
the other traditional determinants, an increase in the level of debt rises current 
consumption growth whereas it has negative effect in future consumption. The 
adjustment of the equations with debt is better and only the lagged growth of 
housing wealth is not statistically significant compared to the previous 
specification. Moreover, when the endogeneity of income and debt is 
considered, the expected income variable becomes insignificant and the lagged 
consumption variable coefficient becomes significant but less relevant than 
previously.   
It is interesting that now, compared with the IV results in Table 1, the housing 
wealth effect becomes less significant and with a lower coefficient. The 
difference with the other wealth variable (net financial) is notorious, as in this 
case the coefficient remains unchanged and continue being very significant. 
Probably, part of the sensitivity of housing wealth in previous specifications 
was capturing the existence of credit constraints due to its role as collateral (see 
Mian, 2012). Also Muellbauer and his co-authors (e.g., Aron et al. 2011) have 
shown that the easing of credit standards during the 2000s was linked to the 
boom in house prices and that has influenced consumption behaviour in 
countries like the US or the UK.  
The second additional financial factor considers a precautionary savings effect. 
Thus columns 5 and 6 in Table 2 incorporate our measure of labour uncertainty: 
the volatility of the change in unemployment. All else being equal, we find that 
an increase in income uncertainty reduces consumption as result of 
precautionary behaviour.6 As expected, all the other estimated parameters 
remain with very similar coefficients apart from those of wealth, which 
diminish again. Therefore, in our dataset the volatility of change in the 
unemployment rate seems to be a good proxy for the labour income risk. This 
result is similar to the one found by Mody et al. (2012) but in their case 
uncertainty is measured by the level of unemployment rather than its 
variability. 
We can use these results to illustrate how housing debt has influenced the 
behaviour of consumption and saving in Germany and the US in the last 
decade, which we saw in the introduction were showing very different 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
6 The empirical analysis suggested that it is the change in our proxy for uncertainty what is 
relevant for the change in consumption. This is consistent with theory, as if the level of 
uncertainty affects saving ratio, it should be the changes in uncertainty what influences the 
changes in consumption.    
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dynamics. Thus, Figure 5 presents the contribution of household debt to (per 
capita) consumption growth using the parameters estimated in Table 2. There 
has been a lack of synchronisation between these two economies in that respect. 
At the beginning of the 2000s Germany presented relatively high indebtedness, 
and its deleveraging process represented a moderate drag on its consumption 
rate. By contrast, debt accumulation by US households allowed them to support 
consumption growth. After 2008 the deleveraging process represented a drag to 
US consumption growth, although the situation was reversed by 2013. On the 
contrary, it seems that in Germany debt has not influenced private consumption 
growth after the financial crisis. 
 
Figure 5. Contribution of household debt to the growth of (per capita) 
consumption: US and Germany 
4. Robustness: the presence of non-Ricardian effects 
The existence of credit constraints and uncertainty may also cause the 
appearance of non-Ricardian effects when considering government decisions. 
And the recent unprecedented increase in public debt during the financial crisis 
may have been a very relevant factor for consumption dynamics.  
Given the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area after 2010 we have decided to 
consider the spreads of long term interest rates (with respect to a world GDP 
weighted average) in our regression analysis instead of the most traditional 
approach of including the public debt or the fiscal balance (see, for example, 
Mody et al. 2012). We prefer this variable as it is probably a more 
comprehensive measure of all the burdens (observed and contingent) public 
finances could support in the short and long run. Besides, this is an indirect 
way to check for the influence of an additional credit constrains factor in 
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consumption given the severe sustainability problems in public debt in some of 
the advanced economies. For those countries, markets may require a higher 
interest rate to finance public and private activities. For example, in the euro 
area bank lending rates became very heterogeneous across certain countries 
after the sovereign debt crisis. 
TABLE 3. ESTIMATION OF THE BASIC CONSUMPTION FUNCTION:  
Non-Ricardian effects.  
Dependent variable: consumption growth per capita. Country and time fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
Constant 0.014*** (0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Consumption growth (-1) 0.166** (0.072) 
0.237*** 
(0.050) 
0.080** 
(0.034) 
0.144*** 
(0.050) 
Income growth 0.296*** (0.032) 
0.177 
(0.141) 
0.247*** 
(0.029) 
0.262** 
(0.132) 
Income growth expectations 0.047*** (0.006) 
0.027 
(0.022) 
0.035*** 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.020) 
Change in the Gini index (-1) -0.163** (0.072) 
-0.186** 
(0.078) 
-0.130** 
(0.065) 
-0.140* 
(0.072) 
Net financial assets growth (-1) 0.025*** (0.006) 
0.030*** 
(0.007) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.020*** 
(0.007) 
Housing wealth growth (-1) 0.037*** (0.013) 
0.046*** 
(0.015) 
0.019 
(0.012) 
0.026* 
(0.014) 
Housing wealth growth (-2) -0.027** (0.012) 
-0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
Real interest rate change (-1) -0.102** (0.041) 
-0.144*** 
(0.054) 
-0.079** 
(0.037) 
-0.102** 
(0.050) 
Households debt growth - - -0.135*** (0.013) 
-0.098*** 
(0.030) 
Households debt growth (-2) - - -0.039*** (0.012) 
-0.044*** 
(0.014) 
Changes in uncertainty - - -0.010*** (0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
Sovereign spread changes -0.293*** (0.064) 
-0.343* 
(0.202) 
-0.172*** 
(0.059) 
-0.196 
(0.195) 
Error correction mechanism -0.059*** (0.014) 
-0.067*** 
(0.023) 
-0.056*** 
(0.013) 
-0.078*** 
(0.021) 
R2 0.689 0.672 0.749 0.731 
Standard deviation×100 1.276 1.356 1.147 1.208 
Durbin Watson 1.895 1.911 1.860 1.909 
Sargan test - 20.898 [0.231] - 
21.487 
[0.205] 
N. observations 642 601 642 601 
Standard deviations in round brackets; P-values in square brackets; *, **, ***, significant at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively; Instruments: Variables lagged two to three periods plus dependency ratio 
contemporaneous and lagged one period and financial liberalization index lagged one and two 
periods. 
Thus, as a robustness exercise, we want to see if the previous credit-channel and 
uncertainty factors survive in the presence of another financial factor as it is a 
high public debt ratio. Table 3, columns 1 and 2 once we consider the 
disaggregated net financial wealth effect, check whether the interest rate spread 
has a differential impact on private consumption. Under the hypothesis that 
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deficit finance affects current household behaviour we would expect 
consumption to respond negatively to an increase (observed or contingent) in 
the public debt ratio. Such a response would be consistent with a negative 
impact of the sovereign spread. As this variable is included jointly with the real 
interest rate, this channel is not contaminated by a substitution effect. When the 
regression is estimated by OLS the sovereign spread is negatively signed and 
very significant. However, when it is instrumented, the statistically significance 
drops substantially, to 9%. Compared to the results in column 4 Table 1B, the 
most significant change in the other coefficients is that of the real interest rate, 
that now is higher in absolute terms, becoming significant at 0.9%.     Columns 3 
and 4 of Table 3 add the other financial factors considered in previous section: 
household’s debt and uncertainty. Again the sovereign spread is negatively 
signed but it losses all statistical relevance. Other checks with a different set of 
instruments did not provide favourable results. As a consequence, this could 
imply that non-Ricardian effects identified elsewhere could be the consequence 
of the presence of more general credit constrains effects. In fact, when we added 
public debt in the specification including household’s debt and uncertainty it 
was also no significant.   
5. Consumption 2008-2013: a country comparison  
This section makes a cross-country comparison of the determinants of 
consumption between 2008 and 2013 using the previously estimated 
behavioural equations. We are interested in an assessment of the countries for 
which the non-traditional determinants may be more relevant. In particular, we 
are interested first, in the relevance of the increase of household debt level 
before 2007 and the debt deleveraging afterwards for dampening consumption 
behaviour in the most recent period, and second, on how the increase in labour 
income uncertainty has also influenced that behaviour. 
Figure 6 analyses the determinants of (per capita) consumption growth in the 
period 2008-2013 taking as a benchmark the estimated equation that takes into 
account both financial factors (i.e. Table 2, column 6). The countries are grouped 
according to their average growth in consumption during that period.  
Korea showed the highest increase in consumption in this sample whereas 
Spain, followed by Ireland, experienced the largest decline. The bars represent 
the estimated annual average private consumption growth rate during the 
period 2008-2013. These bars are divided into the contribution from the 
traditional determinants (country fixed effects, inertia, income, expected 
income, gini index, disaggregated wealth, interest rate and error correction 
mechanism), changes in uncertainty and household debt growth (the sum of the 
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contemporaneous and the lagged effects). All these factors add to the estimated 
value (the red bullet) that may be compared with the observed value (the black 
diamond). 
 
Figure 6. Contributory factors to the private consumption growth rate after 
the financial crisis (2008-2013) 
The equation seems to capture relatively well the changes in private 
consumption during the recession. It successfully predicts the sign of the 
average growth rate in most countries, and the residuals are relatively low. On 
average, the traditional determinants of private consumption are the major 
explanatory factors of its behaviour during the recession. The two additional 
financial factors considered in the paper also play a relevant role in constraining 
consumption in some countries and that effect seems to be more relevant in 
countries where consumption fell. 
According to our results, in most of the countries where consumption 
increased, per capita real debt was higher in 2013 compared to 2008, being the 
exceptions Germany, Austria and US. On the contrary, in the countries where 
private consumption diminished, households’ debt also declined, apart from 
France and Netherlands. In that respect, the contribution of debt to 
consumption has accentuated that of their traditional determinants in most of 
countries. For example, in the countries reducing debt in this period (US, UK, 
ESP, POR, ITA, IRL, GER, DEN and AUS) it explains an average reduction of 
around 0.2% in per capita private consumption out of an average decline of 
0.8%. 
Finally, the contribution of uncertainty is of a minor order, except in countries 
like Ireland and Spain (and to a lower extent US and Canada). For these two 
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countries the variability of unemployment explains an average decline of per 
capita private consumption of 0.4%, out of the 2.1% reduction observed; 
however, in specific periods it could be very important. For example, in the 
period 2007-2009 the aggregate saving ratio of this sample of countries 
increased by 2.3 percentage points, of which 1 pp (40%) is explained by the 
variability in unemployment. This effect is in the lower part of the range 
encountered by Mody et al., 2012; which estimate that at least two-fifths of the 
increase in saving in this period in the OECD countries can be attributed to 
unemployment risk and the GDP volatility.  
6. Conclusions and future research 
The empirical literature on consumption behaviour has emphasised the 
importance of financial innovation and deregulation to explain the shifts in 
wealth and credit conditions for understanding the boom in consumption 
preceding the crisis and the weakness in the recovery period. And recently, 
some authors have mentioned that “debt overhang” linked especially to the 
mortgage developments in some advanced economies, may have an 
independent role besides more traditional financial factors in explaining this 
weakness in consumption.  
This paper has presented the first cross country evidence of the importance of 
the household balance-sheet composition to explain the slow recovery of 
consumption after 2008. Using the panel data of 21 OECD countries from 1980 
to 2013 we estimated a traditional dynamic consumption equation that 
considers wealth composition in addition to the standard effect of income 
(observed and expected) and interest rates. Once we take into account the 
endogeneity, there are relevant effects of both financial assets and housing 
stocks, reinforcing the influence of credit conditions on consumption through 
the housing market. 
Moreover, we find a better specification when unemployment volatility and 
household debt dynamics are considered as additional determinants. Both a 
positive leverage effect and a negative debt overhang effect are significant 
explaining per capita consumption growth. And uncertainty is crucial in 
explaining the saving behaviour of households, especially at the turning points 
of the cycle (2007-2009). That implies the relevance of uncertainty capturing the 
precautionary savings effect and the balance-sheet composition measuring 
households’ financial soundness.  
Looking at balance sheet effects from other sectors, we measure the possible 
public debt effect through the changes in the long term interest rate spread. 
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That does not have a significant effect on private consumption once we take 
into account the household’s debt dynamics. Therefore, it seems that non-
Ricardian effects do not seem relevant once a general credit constrain effect is 
considered. 
Our findings imply that the deleveraging process in countries like the US, the 
UK or Spain after 2008 explains around 40% of the drop observed in 
consumption. Furthermore, the uncertainty arising from the increase in 
unemployment in some European countries (Spain and Ireland) has been an 
additional factor which explains their consumption dynamics relative to other 
OECD countries. In particular, 40% of the increase in savings in this sample of 
countries between 2007 and 2009 can be explained by the increase in 
uncertainty. 
However, more robustness exercises are needed to understand the interaction 
of aggregated consumption and financial variables before we extract policy 
implications or try to anticipate the expected movement of household spending 
in future. Note that current macroeconomic policies, such as fiscal transfers to 
favour household debt restructuring or cuts in interest rates to historic lows, are 
having an impact on the aggregate household debt reduction and on the 
household cash-flow and they are relevant counterweights of consumption 
dynamics. Similarly, the restructuring process of financial institutions in some 
countries is affecting credit conditions. Thus, it is relevant to analyse how that 
specific set of policies may have affected the consumption dynamics of certain 
countries. From a technical perspective, we leave for further research higher 
dimensional frameworks, like panel VAR, which consider the heterogeneity of 
the parameters and the interactions among regressors.  
  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1415
Appendix 1. The dataset7 
The 21 OECD countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. 
 
Real consumption: Obtained from the OECD database and Datastream. 
Population: OECD. 
Nominal consumption: Obtained from the OECD, Datastream and national 
statistical sources. 
Gross disposable income: OECD. 
Consumer confidence (income growth expectations): Obtained from the 
OECD and national statistical sources. 
Gini Index: The Standardized World Income Inequality Database and the 
OECD. 
Financial assets: Obtained from the OECD, enlarged by the year-on-year 
growth rate of Stock Exchange Index, adjusted by the regression coefficient 
between both variables, at country-level. 
Household debt: See previous variable. Missing values were generated with 
information from bank credit. 
Non-financial wealth: defined as real housing stock times housing prices. The 
initial condition for real fixed capital stock is obtained from the EU-KLEMS 
database, if available. For the other countries, the initial condition is calculated 
dividing real housing investment (obtained from the OECD and AMECO) in 
1980 by a country specific estimated ratio between real housing investment and 
real housing stock. This estimated ratio depends on per capita GDP at PPP in 
1980, from the IMF. The depreciation rate of the housing stock is estimated at 
2% per year. Finally, housing prices are obtained from the International House 
Price Database, provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. 
Long-term interest rate: Obtained from the OECD, Datastream and AMECO 
data base. It corresponds to that of 10-year government debt yields. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
7?The full data set is available upon request. 
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Long-term interest rate spread: It is obtained as the difference between the 
long-term interest rate for each country and the world one, obtained as the PPP-
weighted average of the corresponding interest rates of this sample of countries.   
Unemployment: Obtained from OECD and Datastream. 
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